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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the strength of the First Amendment arises from the
power of its rhetoric. It is a rare judge who can decide a First Amend-
ment case without composing, or at least copying, a short ode to free
speech. If nothing else, the introductory rhetoric, like a congressional
benediction, solemnizes the decision, reiterating that paramount val-
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ues are at stake.' The rhetoric represents a thumb on the scale favor-
ing protection of First Amendment values.2
Within the broad arena of education law, a rhetoric of academic
freedom has developed, much of it springing from Justice Brennan's
memorable passage in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.3
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 'The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools.' The classroom is peculiarly the 'market-
place of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.' 4
Despite the tributes, courts are remarkably consistent in their un-
willingness to give analytical shape to the rhetoric of academic free-
dom. Twenty years ago, a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit
noted: "The Supreme Court of the United States has discussed aca-
demic freedom in eloquent and isolated statements. Lower courts
have spoken more frequently, but none has clearly defined the theory's
legal contours. Nor will I."5 Recently, the Ninth Circuit noted:
"Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has determined what
scope of First Amendment protection is to be given a public college
professor's classroom speech. We decline to define today the precise
contours of the protection the First Amendment provides the class-
room speech of college professors. ... 6
1. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984)(O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)(recoguizing that government acknowledgments of religion serve secular
purposes by "solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future,
and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society")
2. The power of rhetoric did not go unnoticed by the Justices who sought to diminish
the strictures of the Establishment Clause. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
92 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(criticizing Court's reliance on Jefferson's
Wall of Separation metaphor); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., 668, 673 (1984)(rec-
oguizing that Jefferson's Wall of Separation metaphor "is not a wholly accurate
description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between
church and state")
3. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
4. Id. at 603 (alteration in original)(citations omitted). For other discussions of the
importance of academic freedom, see Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
250 (1957)(Warren, C.J., plurality); Id. at 260-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952)(Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring);and Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055, 1063-64 (4th Cir. 1981).
5. Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Or. 1976) (citations omitted).
6. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 813 (E.D. Ark. 1979)(declining to reach issue of
academic freedom).
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Not surprisingly then, scholars are just as consistent in criticizing
courts' failure to give shape to the rhetoric. 7 To borrow a wonderful
phrase: 'Lacking definition or guiding principal, the doctrine floats in
the law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles."8 This analogy
would be entirely accurate except that barnacles tend to look some-
what alike while academic freedom cases do not. The disparity of con-
clusions is stunning: a school district may refuse to rehire a teacher
because he assigned Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.9 A school dis-
trict may not dismiss a teacher because he assigned Kurt Vonnegut's
"Welcome to the Monkey House."io A university professor has a right
of academic freedom in the grades he assigns."i No, he does not.' 2 A
high school art teacher cannot be compelled to recite the Pledge of Al-
legiance,' 3 but a kindergarten teacher can be so compelled.' 4 A
7. E.g., Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Aca-
demic Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1265, 1289 (1988)("A sizeable litera-
ture of legal commentary asserts that the Supreme Court constitutionalized
academic freedom without adequately defining it.")
The body of scholarship dealing with academic freedom is substantial. Three
law reviews have devoted symposia to the subject: Academic Freedom and Ten-
ure Symposium, 15 PACE L. REv. 1 (1994); Symposium, Freedom and Tenure in
the Academy: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1904 Statement of Principles, 53
LAW & CONTEIaP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 1; Symposium on Academic Freedom,
66 TEx. L. REv. 1247 (1988). A sampling of articles not included in these symposia
include J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989); Gregory A. Clarick, Public School Teach-
ers and the First Amendment: Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
693 (1990); Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public
School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976);
Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say,
Does that Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1
(1993); Katheryn D. Katz, The First Amendment's Protection of Expressive Activ-
ity in the University Classroom: A Constitutional Myth, 16 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 857
(1983); Norman R. Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom:
A Search For Standards, 8 GA. L. REv. 837 (1974); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Contro-
versy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39
GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 1032 (1971); William Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights
of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841 (1970); Charles Alan Wright, The
Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969); Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1968); Mark G. Yudof, Three
Faces ofAcademic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REV. 831 (1987); John M. Ryan, Comment,
Teacher Free Speech in the Public Schools: Just When You Thought It was Safe to
Talk, 67 NEB. L. REv. 695 (1988).
8. Byrne, supra note 7, at 253.
9. See Parker v. Board of Educ. 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1965).
10. See Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
11. See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Termination of
James E. Johnson's Teaching Contract, 451 N.W.2d 343, 346 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990).
12. See Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986).
13. See Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972).
14. See Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979).
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teacher's right of academic freedom encompasses a right to wear a tur-
tleneck in preference to a necktie.15 No more so than he has a consti-
tutional right to have students sit in a circle in preference to rows. i 6
A high school teacher has a right of academic freedom "in choosing a
particular pedagogical method for a course, so long as the course is
part of the school's official curriculum and the teaching method serves
a demonstrable educational purpose."1 7 A high school teacher has no
right of academic freedom.iS
The formulas used to resolve academic freedom cases are equally
divergent. The "material and substantial interference" standard of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Districti9 has
been applied, 20 as has the balancing test of Pickering v. Board of Edu-
cation of Township High School District 205.21 The "legitimate peda-
gogical concern" standard of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier22
is now the dominant framework,23 but courts are in disagreement as
to how to apply it. Some courts apply Hazelwood in straightforward
15. See East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 844 (2d Cir.
1977)(en banc). The claim of academic freedom in classroom attire does not mark
the far end of the spectrum of academic freedom claims. One teacher asserted
that the right of academic freedom included the authority to permanently remove
the glossary from more than one hundred textbooks. See Board of Trustees v.
Landry, 638 N.E.2d 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
16. See East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 857 n.5 (2d Cir.
1977)(en banc).
17. Watson v. Eagle County Sch. Dist. RE-50, 797 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990); see also State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ. v. Ol-
son, 687 P.2d 429, 437 (Colo. 1984)(dicta regarding community college
instructors).
18. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
20. See Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F.Supp. 302, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1979);
Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
21. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364
(4th Cir. 1998)(en banc)(holding that drama instructor's choice of play not a mat-
ter of public concern); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005 (2d Cir. 1994)(applying
Pickering to law professor's in-class remarks); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch.
Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989)(holding that teacher's use of supplemental
reading materials for class not matter of public concern); Martin v. Parrish, 805
F.2d 583, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1986)(applying Pickering to teacher's in-class use of
profanity); Birdwell v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 491 F.2d 490, 493 (8th Cir.
1974)(applying Pickering to high school teacher's classroom remarks); Westbrook
v. Teton County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 918 F. Supp. 1475, 1482 (D. Wyo. 1996)(apply-
ing Pickering test to school policy prohibiting open criticism of staff); Scallet v.
Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996)(applying Pickering to profes-
sor's in-class remarks); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp.
1407 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (applying Pickering test to college professor's in-class
speech).
22. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
23. See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2nd Cir. 1994);
Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944
F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir. 1991); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir.
[Vol. 77:301
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
fashion.24 Other courts supplement Hazelwood with a notice stan-
dard.25 Some courts have suggested that Hazelwood requires a bal-
ancing test.26
This schizophrenia is not limited to varying courts. Justice Bren-
nan, whose writing in Keyishian inspired many lower courts to recog-
nize a right of academic freedom in the secondary school setting, also
wrote:
The Court of Appeals stated that academic freedom embodies the principle
that individual instructors are at liberty to teach that which they deem to be
appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment. But, in the State of
Louisiana, courses in public schools are prescribed by the State Board of Edu-
cation and teachers are not free, absent permission, to teach courses different
from what is required. 'Academic freedom,' at least as it is commonly under-
stood, is not a relevant concept in this context.2 7
Thus, Justice Brennan takes a "special concern of the First Amend-
ment" in one case and reduces it to an irrelevant concept in another.
High school academic freedom took flight nearly three decades ago,
powered by the rhetoric of Keyishian.28 The arc of its trajectory flat-
tened, however, as courts began to question whether academic free-
dom claims were really just arguments as to who was entitled to
exercise state power.29 Recently, academic freedom cases have pop-
1991); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.
1990); Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1998).
24. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
25. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998);
Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993).
26. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 936 F. Supp. 676, 684 (E.D.
Mo. 1996), rev'd, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilder v. Board of Educ. 944 P.2d
598, 602 (Colo Ct. App. 1997), rev'd, 960 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1998).
27. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 586 n.6 (1987)(citations omitted); see also
Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 287
(1984)(stating that the Court has never recognized that the faculty has a consti-
tutional right to participate in the policymaking of academic institutions).
28. For a sample of the early cases, see Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.
1969); Webb v. Lake Mills Community Sch. Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa
1972); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
vacated, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D.
Mass. 1971),affd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.1971); and Parducci v. Rut-
land, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
29. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3rd Cir. 1990); Kirk-
land v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 795 (5th Cir. 1989); Lovelace v.
Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir. 1986); Cary v. Board of
Educ. Arapahoe Sch. Dist., 598 F.2d 535, 542-43 (10th Cir. 1979); Adams v.
Campbell County Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 1975); Ahern v.
Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1972).
1998]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ped up again,30 reduced in scope but still lacking analytical
coherence. 3 1
A number of factors contribute to this state of affairs. Courts have
failed to examine or define the parameters of academic freedom.
Courts also have failed to inquire into the nature and theoretical ori-
gins of academic freedom. While academic freedom had its genesis in
the evoluton of the modern university,32 the bulk of academic freedom
cases have arisen in the context of secondary schools.3 3 There is much
salience in the observation that the justification for academic freedom
must be found in the character and function of the institution and the
scholar's role within that institution.34
Most significantly, however, courts have not confronted the analyt-
ical questions that must be addressed if academic freedom is to be con-
stitutionalized. These questions are unique in constitutional theory:
To what extent does the Constitution recognize a right that is not
available to the public at large? And to what extent does the Constitu-
tion, which typically operates to limit state power, protect an individ-
ual's exercise of state power?
High school academic freedom lies along a speech continuum
bounded at one end by wholly private speech and on the other end by
statements that are unmistakably speech of the government. At vari-
ous points along the continuum a different set of issues is raised: the
three-tiered analysis of public forum jurisprudence, 3 5 the rules that
apply to funding for the National Endowment for the Arts, 36 the rules
underlying government regulation of the airwaves, 3 7 and, of course,
30. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998)(en
banc); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996);
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorg. Sch. Dist. R-2, 936 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev'd,
147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998); Westbrook v. Teton County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 918 F.
Supp. 1475 (D. Wyo. 1996); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Va.
1996); Silva v. University of New Hampshire, 888 F. Supp. 293 (D. N.H. 1994);
Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1998); Hosford v. School Comm.,
659 N.E. 2d 1178 (Mass. 1996).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 162-203.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 41-58.
33. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1296 ("[Slchoolteachers have greatly outnumbered
academics as litigants in academic freedom cases.")
34. See Glenn R. Morrow, Academic Freedom, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 4, 6 (David L. Sills ed., MacMillan & Free Press 1968).
While it is in the interest of public school teachers to position themselves as
closely as possible to university faculty, this is not necessarily a healthy develop-
ment for academic freedom at the university which depends on a recognition of
the unique status and character of the university.
35. See e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
36. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998); Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
37. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994).
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claims of academic freedom within public institutions. Because of its
relative position on the continuum, the high school setting provides a
convenient vehicle for identifying the theoretical hurdles that must be
overcome if a right of academic freedom is to be formulated based on
something more than rhetoric.
II. WHAT IS ACADEMIC FREEDOM?
Discussions of academic freedom inevitably are preceded by power-
ful images that color our perceptions of the issues: Socrates put to
death for raising difficult questions; Galileo brought before the Inqui-
sition for accurately reporting what he saw through the telescope; and
John Scopes haled up on criminal charges for instructing high school
students on scientific observations that were already sixty-five years
old. Notwithstanding the clarity of these images, the term "academic
freedom" itself is hardly self-defining. It is indicative of the malleabil-
ity of the term that Laurence Tribe can observe that the Supreme
Court has never recognized academic freedom as an independent con-
stitutional doctrine, 38 while William Van Alstyne can write that the
Court has incorporated academic freedom into the Constitution, 39 and
both can be right.40
Prior to the Civil War, the concept of academic freedom was "liter-
ally inconceivable" in the educational institutions of this country.4 '
Nineteenth century colleges were not the modern research institu-
tions of today. "The goal of higher education was to train young men
in religious piety and mental discipline as a preparation for the clergy
and other gentlemanly professions, such as law and medicine."42
Original knowledge was not produced on campus. Instead, it was dis-
bursed down a chain of command that, as often as not, originated with
God.4 3 Against this cultural backdrop, academic freedom would only
38. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmORicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAv, § 12-4, at 812-13 n.32
(2d ed. 1988).
39. See William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the
Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 81.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 241-46 for the proposition that Professor Al-
styne is right, and see infra text accompanying notes 91-111 for the proposition
that Professor Tribe is right.
41. See Byrne, supra note 7, at 269; see also RicHARu HOFSTADTER & WALTER P.
METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES, 263
(1955)("For the most part, the concept of academic freedom as it is usually ex-
pressed today had not received a clear formulation in the ante-bellum period.");
Metzger, supra note 7, at 1265 ("T]he systematic search for a definition did not
effectively begin until after the Civil War and did not bear significant fruit until
after the turn of the century.")
42. Byrne, supra note 7 at 269.
43. The Book of Genesis contains a short account of humankind's pursuit of original
knowledge, and it does not have a happy ending. See Genesis 3:1-24.
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result in divine retribution, generally in the form of career
termination.
Universities expanded their function beyond merely dispersing
knowledge. "The change is usefully, if simple-mindedly, expressed as
a movement from a paradigm of fixed values vouchsafed by religious
faith to one of relative truths continuously revised by scientific en-
deavor."4 4 Questioning prevailing knowledge was no longer consid-
ered an attack upon religious faith-at least within the university.
Outside the university, however, the notion that faith and science
were severable was not so quick to catch on, especially with lay re-
gents. To sustain the vitality of the new university, a mechanism was
needed to protect the process of distilling truth through challenges to
accepted wisdom.45
German universities of the time were guided by two notions, lehr-
freiheit and lernfreiheit, which were alien to American universities.4 6
Lehrfreiheit, or freedom to teach, afforded university professors the
latitude to determine the content of their lectures and publish the
findings of their research outside the chain of command that bound
other government officials.47 This freedom was not considered a right
so much as an "exceptional privilege" of the university professor that
did not extend to civil servants of similar rank or to secondary school
teachers. 48
Lernfreiheit, or freedom to learn, distanced the university from any
control over a student's course of study except for preparation for state
professional examinations. 4 9 Unlike school children, university stu-
dents presented themselves as autonomous and self-reliant persons
responsible for making their own way in the world outside the
university.50
These concepts were considered by a committee of the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) charged with writing a
report on academic freedom and tenure. The report, released in 1915
when educational theorist John Dewey was chairman of the AAUP, is
regarded as the seminal statement on academic freedom. While the
protections of lehrfreiheit, freedom to teach, were adopted by the
AAUP, the AAUP took the position that these protections were not
applicable to all post-secondary institutions. Consistent with the
transformation of the university that created the need for academic
44. Byrne, supra note 7, at 271; see also Metzger, supra note 7, at 1267-69.
45. See Byrne, supra note 7, at 278-79; Metzger, supra note 7, at 1267-69.
46. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1269; Goldstein, supra note 7, at 1299.
47. See Byrne, supra note 7, at 272; Metzger, supra note 7, at 1269-70; Goldstein,
supra note 7, at 1299.
48. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1269-70.
49. See id.; Goldstein, supra note 7, at 1299.
50. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1269-70; Bryne, supra note 7, at 272-73; Goldstein,
supra note 7, at 1299.
[Vol. 77:301
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
freedom, the committee drew a distinction between what it considered
to be a true university-a place where free inquiry was accepted-and
what it labeled "proprietary institutions," schools that existed to prop-
agate prescribed doctrines.51 Teachers in the latter institutions could
make no claim to academic freedom. Public school teachers, of course,
did not occupy the position of university faculty and thus were not
included in the AAUP's embrace of lehrfreiheit.52
In its 1915 Declaration of Principles, the AAUP defined academic
freedom as "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and
investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclu-
sions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or pe-
nalization because the conclusions are unacceptable to some
constituted authority within or beyond the institution."53
Academic freedom of this sort does not insulate the scholars from
criticism or even sanctions.54 Indeed, perhaps no group of writers look
over their shoulders with greater trepidation than academics, their ca-
reers quite literally dependent upon writing something that meets ac-
cepted standards. 55 Who should set the standard by which the
scholar's work is to be evaluated-the clergy, lay regents, the individ-
ual scholar, the academy, or the university as a self-governing entity?
If, as is the general practice, it is the university informed by the acad-
emy that sets the standard, claims of academic freedom raised by indi-
vidual professors can run headlong into what has been called the
institutional academic freedom of the university to conduct its affairs
free from judicial interference. 56
51. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1279.
52. See id. at 1271-73. The AAUP also declined to adopt lernfreiheit, possibly be-
cause of the different supervisory expectations placed upon American universi-
ties. See id. at 1271-72.
53. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, THE 1915 DECLARATION OF
PaiNcIPLEs, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENuRE 155 (Louis Joughin ed. 1969); see
also ROBERT M. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TnE 6 (1955).
54. See Byrne, supra note 7, at 258-59.
55. See id. (stating that persons who engage in academic speech are rigidly
controlled).
56. See e.g., Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he asserted aca-
demic freedom of a professor can conflict with the academic freedom of the uni-
versity to make decisions affecting that professor."); Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F.
Supp. 1425, 1433 (C.D. I1M. 1996)(citations omitted)("Academic freedom refers to
the freedom of university professors and the university administrators to func-
tion autonomously, without interference from the government. It also refers to
the freedom of individual teachers to not suffer interference by the administra-
tors of the university. These two freedoms can come into conflict."); Cooper v.
Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 813 (E.D. Ark. 1979)(The present case is particularly
difficult because it involves a fundamental tension between the academic freedom
of the individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university administra-
tion, and the academic freedom of the university to be free of government, includ-
ing judicial, interference."). For Supreme Court discussion of this freedom see
Regents of the Univ. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985); Widmar v. Vincent,
19981
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Most significant for purposes of the discussion that follows, the
AAUP included a value not expressly embodied by the two German
freedoms: the freedom of extracurricular comment. In 1915, a police
officer had a right to talk politics but not a right to be a police officer.5 7
Thus, there was no constitutional prohibition against conditioning a
university professor's employment upon what he might say as a citi-
zen. As a result, in order to allow public discussions to benefit from
the expertise of the academy, the AAUP included the freedom of extra-
curricular comment in the scope of academic freedom.5 8
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. The Road to Keyishian
It was only after the issuance of the AAUP's Declaration of Princi-
ples was issued that courts began discussing academic freedom.
Meyer v. Nebraska59 is often mentioned as the United States Supreme
Court's earliest exposition of a right of academic freedom.60 Meyer, a
Lochner era case, involved a private school teacher who was convicted
of violating a statute that criminalized teaching the German lan-
guage. At this time, modem free speech doctrine amounted to little
more than a dissent by Justices Holmes and Brandeis.61 In fact, it
was not until two years after Meyer that the Supreme Court first held
that the First Amendment applied to the states. 62 Thus, while to the
modern eye Meyer presented a classic example of content discrimina-
tion, the First Amendment was not yet equipped to resist such pro-
scriptions, leaving the statute to be challenged and overturned on
substantive due process grounds.
In the Supreme Court's view, the group of rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment included the right "to engage in any of the
common occupations of life," which, of course, included teaching.63
454 U.S. 263, 279 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); and Regents of the Univ. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). See also Paul Brest, Protecting Academic Free-
dom Through the First Amendment: Raising the Unanswered Questions, 66 TEx.
L. REV. 1359 (1988); Matthew W. Finken, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom
and the First Amendment, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1323 (1988); Mark G. Yudof, Intramu-
ral Musings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to Professor Finken, 66 TEx. L. REV.
1351 (1988); Yudof, supra note 7, at 851-57. In the end, institutional academic
freedom appears to nothing more than a manner of phrasing judicial deference to
the expertise of the particular agency.
57. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
58. See Goldstein, supra note 7, at 1299.
59. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
60. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968); Goldstein, supra note 7, at 1305-
09; Van Alstyne, supra note 39, at 92.
61. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1919)(Holmes, J. dissenting).
62. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
63. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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The right to engage in the common occupations of life is a right not all
that distinct from a baker's right to contract. 64 To the extent that the
Court in Meyer was concerned with the exchange of knowledge, it fo-
cused on the right of students to acquire knowledge,6 5 not necessarily
a teacher's right to individual autonomy within an educational institu-
tion.6 6 While Meyer is rightfully recognized as a formative academic
freedom case,67 the teacher in Meyer, like the teacher in its companion
case, Bartels v. Iowa,68 was privately employed. Therefore, the case
involved academic freedom of the sort embodied by Socrates, freedom
of one citizen to instruct another on a subject of their mutual choosing.
As a result, the Supreme Court could and did observe that the case did
not raise the issue of "the state's power to prescribe a curriculum for
institutions which it supports."69
If Meyer marked the beginning of a new era, the dawn was very
slow in breaking. The term "academic freedom" did not appear in a
Supreme Court opinion for almost thirty years.
Just as the educational setting played a significant role in the
evolution of equal protection doctrine,70 it also played a crucial role in
dispatching the right-privilege distinction embodied by Justice
Holmes' epigram regarding police officers and politics. First, Justice
64. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
65. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
66. The teacher's right to instruct as he pleased would have been presented more
directly if he had been teaching German to the students despite the contrary
wishes of the students' parents. Recognizing that the teacher possessed such a
right, however, would have directly conflicted with a third concern articulated in
Meyer, "the power of parents to control the education of their own." Id. at 401.
Two years after Meyer, the Supreme Court seemed to place the full weight of the
decision on this last concern, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925), and today, Meyer has become a vehicle for parents to challenge the curric-
ular choices made by school authorities. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro
City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996)(challenging community service re-
quirement); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996) (same);
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995)(challeng-
ing safe sex program); Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988)(chal-
lenging requirements for home schooling); Doe v. Irvin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.
1980) (challenging condom distribution program); Null v. Board of Educ., 815
F. Supp. 937 (S.D. W. Va. 1993)(challenging home schooling requirements);
Clonlara, Inc., v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp. 1442 (E.D. Mich. 1989)(same); Hanson v.
Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980)(same); Curtis v. School Comm.,
652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995)(challenging program of condom availability); People
v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 1993)(challenging requirements for home
schooling); Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)(chal-
lenging condom distribution program).
67. See Van Alstyne, supra note 39, at 90.
68. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
69. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
70. See Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
1998]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Douglas invoked academic freedom in Adler v. Board of Education,71 a
McCarthy era case challenging New York's Feinberg law which con-
tained a host of First Amendment indignities. For the time being,
however, the right-privilege distinction held, relegating Justice Doug-
las' exhortations to a dissent. Later that same year, however, the
Supreme Court upheld a challenge by college professors to a loyalty
oath requirement in Wieman v. Updegraff.72 Justice Frankfurter con-
curred, authoring one of the classic statements concerning academic
freedom:
The process of education has naturally enough been the basis of hope for the
endurance of our democracy on the part of all our great leaders, from Thomas
Jefferson onwards.
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary
grades to the university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to
indulge in hyperbole. 7 3
Despite the breadth of Justice Frankfurter's language, to the ex-
tent that Wieman involved academic freedom, the freedom at issue in-
volved extracurricular comment. As with Meyer and Adler, the
question of whether the First Amendment placed a limitation on the
state's ability to regulate persons when they spoke as agents of the
state was not presented.
Speech inside the classroom was involved in Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire,74 but the plurality opinion by Chief Justice Warren carefully
excluded the issue of the extent to which the state could regulate the
content of state-supported education. Paul Sweezy was haled before a
state attorney general charged with rooting out subversive persons.
Mr. Sweezy was suspected of being just that sort of person and was
generally forthright in his answers. Nevertheless, he refused to an-
swer a question regarding a guest lecture he had delivered to a hu-
manities class at the University of New Hampshire. 75 Mr. Sweezy's
status as a guest lecturer, and therefore private citizen, left the
Supreme Court with little opportunity to examine the state's ability to
regulate the speech of teachers employed by the state. Chief Justice
Warren framed the inquiry narrowly:
The State Supreme Court carefully excluded the possibility that the inquiry
was sustainable because of the state interest in the state university .... The
sole basis for the inquiry was to scrutinize the teacher as a person, and the
inquiry must stand or fall on that basis.7 6
Unburdened of the difficult issue, Chief Justice Warren concluded,
"[w]e believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's
71. 342 U.S. 485, 509 (1952).
72. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
73. Id. at 196 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
74. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
75. See id. at 243-44.
76. Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
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liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression-
areas in which government should be extremely reticent to tread."7 7
Justice Frankfurter added a concurrence, drawing academic free-
dom back to the university.
In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A
university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church
or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of
free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates--'to follow the argument
where it leads.'.. . Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept
of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The con-
cern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an ac-
cepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the framework
itself.7 8
While the rhetorical power of Justice Frankfurter's writing seems
at least equal to Justice Brennan's work in Keyishian,7 9 it took Keyi-
shian, and the passage of time, to truly launch the modern academic
freedom cases.8 0 The passage of time, however, appears to have
played the greater role because doctrinally Keyishian broke little new
ground. The case involved another challenge to New York's Feinberg
law by college professors who refused to sign an oath stating that they
had never been members of the Communist party. Fifteen years after
Adler, the Court found the law to be unconstitutional.
While Keyishian anchors many lower court academic freedom
cases, the case had precious little to do with the classroom speech of
teachers. Instead, the right at issue was the right of political associa-
tion,81 which is closely linked to the freedom of extracurricular com-
ment, a right that now extends beyond university professors8 2 to
77. Id. at 250. Chief Justice Warren's description of academic freedom is heavily
anchored to a concern for independent inquiry and the production of scholarship.
No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new
discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social
sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Schol-
arship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civi-
lization will stagnate and die.
Id.
78. Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)(quoting The Open Universities in
South Africa 10-12)( statement of a conference of senior scholars from the Univer-
sity of Cape Town and the University of Witwatersrand).
79. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
80. See e.g., State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ. v. Olson, 687
P.2d 429, 437 (Colo. 1984).
81. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1976)(Brennan, J., plural-
ity)("Keyishian squarely held that political association alone could not, consist-
ently with the First Amendment, constitute an adequate ground for denying
public employment."); see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 185-86 (1972)(cit-
ing Keyishian for proposition that government may not deny rights and privileges
based upon "a citizen's association with an unpopular organization").
82. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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public school teachers,8 3 clerical workers8 4 and trash haulers who
serve the government as independent contractors.8 5
In a very real sense, Keyishian marked the close of the era of loy-
alty oath cases rather than the start of a new era of academic freedom
cases.8 6 After Keyishian, the Court never solidified the rhetoric of the
loyalty oath cases into an individual right of academic freedom within
the educational institution.
B. The Road Not Taken
A year after Keyishian, the Supreme Court decided Epperson v. Ar-
kansas8 7 which involved a challenge to a state statute prohibiting the
teaching of evolution.8 8 The statute was a contemporary of, and simi-
lar to, the statute under which John Scopes had been prosecuted.8 9
While Mr. Scopes lost at trial, he escaped sanction on appeal because
of a sentencing error. 90 The Tennessee Supreme Court, however,
made clear that the constitutionality of the statute was not to be
doubted:
The statute before us is not an exercise of the police power of the state under-
taking to regulate the conduct and contracts of individuals in their dealings
with each other. On the other hand it is an act of the state as a corporation, a
proprietor, an employer. It is a declaration of a master as to the character of
work the master's servant shall, or rather shall not, perform. In dealing with
its own employees engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by
the limitation of ... the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.9 1
Writing for the Supreme Court in Epperson with a now-vibrant
Free Speech Clause at his disposal, Justice Fortas linked the substan-
tive due process decision of Meyer to modern notions of academic free-
dom, reciting Keyishian's admonition that "the First Amendment 'does
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.'" 92
Meyer's revival as a free speech case, however, was cut short as Jus-
tice Fortas abruptly changed directions: "For purposes of the present
case, we need not re-enter the difficult terrain which the Court, in
83. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
84. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
85. See Board of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668
(1996).
86. Actually, Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967), decided later that term marked
the end of the line. Related cases of the era that have not been discussed include
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
87. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
88. See id. at 98.
89. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
90. See id. at 367.
91. Id. at 364-65.
92. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968)(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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1923, traversed without apparent misgivings,"93 ignoring that the
Court, in 1923, expressly had stated that it was not entering that ter-
rain.9 4 In the modern Court's view, the prohibition on evolution was a
straightforward violation of principles set forth in earlier Establish-
ment Clause cases.
While Establishment Clause principles offered an easy resolution
of the case, that resolution did not necessarily occur outside tradi-
tional notions of academic freedom. Indeed, the belief that scientific
knowledge should not be subject to religious veto is precisely the con-
cern that made academic freedom necessary in the first place. In a
very real sense then, Epperson joined the issue of academic freedom in
dramatic fashion. Justice Fortas' discussion, however, did not prompt
a discussion of the relationship between academic freedom and the Es-
tablishment Clause; rather it prompted concurrences from various
Justices distancing themselves from the position stated by Justice
Fortas that was linked to the Free Speech Clause. Justice Harlan dis-
associated himself from the discussion,9 5 while Justice Stewart put a
fence around it.96 Justice Black, often considered a First Amendment
absolutist, directly challenged Justice Fortas in terms that sounded
much like the Tennessee Supreme Court in Scopes:
I am... not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children takes
with him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological, eco-
nomic, political, or religious subjects that the school's managers do not want
discussed.... I question whether it is absolutely certain, as the Court's opin-
ion indicates, that 'academic freedom' permits a teacher to breach his contrac-
tual agreement to teach only the subjects designated by the school authorities
who hired him.9 7
Thus, as the first opportunity to make something out of the rheto-
ric of Keyishian, Epperson did little in that regard. The Court then
remained silent about individual academic freedom for nearly two
decades. 98
93. Id.
94. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,402 (1923)("Nor has challenge been made of
State's power to prescribe a curriculum for the institutions which it supports.")
95. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 115 (Harlan, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring):
It is one thing for a State to determine that 'the subject of higher mathe-
matics, or astronomy, or biology' shall or shall not be included in its pub-
lic school curriculum. It is quite another thing for a State to make it a
criminal offense for a public school teacher so much as to mention the
very existence of an entire system of respected human thought.
Id.
97. Id. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring).
98. The Court, however, did discuss institutional academic freedom. See Regents of
the Univ. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 278-79 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 747-48 (1979)(Powell, J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 312 (1978)(opinion of Powell).
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A genuine high school academic freedom case, Memphis Commu-
nity School District v. Stachura,99 reached the Supreme Court in
1986, but without the academic freedom question. In Stachura, a sev-
enth grade teacher was placed on suspension following a public uproar
over his teaching of a Life Science course that included a component of
sex education. The teacher appeared to be more scapegoat than rene-
gade. The material that the teacher had taught was part of the as-
signed curriculum. 0 0 As a lower court put it, the teacher's "exercise
of 'academic freedom' had followed rather than violated his superior's
instructions."101
The Supreme Court, however, expressly limited its decision to
whether compensatory damages in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 could be based on the jury's assessment of the importance of
the right at stake.1o 2 When the teacher argued that the challenged
damage award was appropriate because the case involved "a substan-
tive constitutional right-[the teacher's] First Amendment right to ac-
ademic freedom,"103 the Court brusquely responded, "[olur grant of
certiorari in this case does not encompass the question whether re-
spondent stated or proved a claim under either the Due Process or the
First Amendment,"o4 hardly an acknowledgment that the underlying
judgment rested on settled law.
Two years later, creationism reappeared in Edwards v. Aquil-
lard, 105 in which the Court assessed the constitutional validity of Lou-
isiana's Balanced Treatment Act that required public schools to teach
creation science if evolution was taught.1 0 6 Again, the case again in-
volved the conflict between science and faith, the traditional
flashpoint for academic freedom disputes. Perhaps sensing the need
to claim the pedagogical high ground, the legislators who adopted the
Act asserted that the Act protected academic freedom.1o7 As men-
tioned above, Justice Brennan, construing academic freedom to mean
an individual right to teach what one pleased, dismissed academic
freedom as irrelevant in a hierarchical system such as the secondary
school setting, using terms that sounded suspiciously like those used
by Justice Black in Epperson, and, by extension, the Tennessee
99. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
100. See id. at 300-01.
101. Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299
(1986).
102. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 304 (1986).
103. Id. at 309 (emphasis in original).
104. Id. at 309 n.12.
105. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 586.
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Supreme Court in Scopes: "[T]eachers are not free, absent permission,
to teach courses different from what is required."' 0 8
In the end, if one stares straight into the light of the Supreme
Court's rhetoric, it is possible to envision a right of academic freedom
that allows teachers to do what Justice Brennan said that they may
not, but as demonstrated by the limitations stated in Meyer and
Sweezy, as well as by the footnotes in Edwards and Stachura, the
Court itself has kept its eyes well-shaded. Individual academic free-
dom cases have come before the Supreme Court in three contexts.
First, Meyer involved a prohibition that today would be quickly settled
on the basis of the First Amendment's prohibition against content-
based restrictions on private speech. 109 Second, academic freedom
played a quixotic role in the creationism cases, offered as an alterna-
tive justification in Epperson and dismissed as irrelevant in Edwards.
Finally, academic freedom was invoked in the loyalty oath cases, all of
which involved freedom of extracurricular comment, a right that is no
longer reserved for teachers. As powerful as the Court's rhetoric
might have been, "Keyishian dealt with that brand of regulation most
offensive to a free society: loyalty oaths. The Court's pronouncements
about academic freedom in that context, however, cannot be extrapo-
lated to deny schools command of their own courses." 110 That, how-
ever, is precisely what happened to Keyishian.'11
IV. THE FIRST COMING OF HIGH SCHOOL ACADEMIC
FREEDOM- PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE
Two years after the United States Supreme Court decided Keyi-
shian, the First Circuit was presented with a case, Keefe v. Ge-
anakos,11 2 in which a high school teacher was dismissed after he
assigned an article from Atlantic Monthly that used the word
"motherfucker."113 The case was framed by two important conces-
sions. First, the district conceded that the teacher possessed a consti-
tutionally protected right of academic freedom, but argued that the
right was limited to using the materials selected by the school commit-
tee. 114 Second, the district conceded that a teacher would have a con-
stitutional right to challenge an arbitrary limitation on classroom
108. Id. at 586 n.6. Accord Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir.
1991)("M[T]he caselaw does not support [the] position that a secondary school
teacher has a constitutional right to academic freedom."); Cary v. Board of Educ.,
598 F.2d 535, 540 (10th Cir. 1979)(quoting with approval Justice Black's concur-
rence in Epperson).
109. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
110. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 112-49.
112. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
113. See id. at 361.
114. See id. at 360.
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materials.115 The issue then was whether the board's action was arbi-
trary. The court stated, "when we consider the facts at bar as we have
elaborated them, we find it difficult not to think that its application to
the present case demeans any proper concept of education."116
Keefe was followed shortly by Parducci v. Rutland'17 which in-
volved the dismissal of a teacher who assigned Kurt Vonnegut's "Wel-
come to the Monkey House" to an eleventh grade class.' 1 8 For
guidance as to the teacher's constitutional rights in the classroom, the
court relied upon Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,119 which famously stated that neither students nor
teachers shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.1 20
Thus, the Parducci court considered the dispositive question to be
whether the assignment caused a "material and substantial disrup-
tion" to the school environment,12' the standard articulated in Tinker
for regulating the private speech of students12 2
Mailloux v. Kiley 123 filled out what came to be the nucleus around
which subsequent high school academic freedom cases came to orbit.
The case concerned the dismissal of a teacher who used the word
"fuck" as a means of explaining the concept of taboo. The First Circuit
initially addressed the case after the teacher obtained a preliminary
injunction from the district court enjoining his dismissal. The appel-
late court appeared to give a measured embrace of its earlier decision
in Keefe:
The court in no way regrets its decision in Keefe v. Geanakos, but it did not
intend thereby to do away with what, to use an old-fashioned term, are consid-
ered the proprieties, or to give carte blanche in the name of academic freedom
to conduct which can reasonably be deemed both offensive and unnecessary to
the accomplishment of educational objectives. 1 2 4
115. See id.
116. Id. at 362.
117. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
118. See id.
119. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
120. See id. at 506.
121. Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355-56 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
122. Tinker involved the authority of school officials to regulate private speech that
happens to occur on school grounds, not the authority of school officials to regu-
late the speech of teachers addressing a captive audience of students. See Hazel-
wood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
123. The case involved three published decisions. The first affirmed the district
court's entry of a preliminary injunction. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp.
1387 (D. Mass. 1971). The second represented the district court's decision on the
merits. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971). The third involved the
First Circuit's review of the final disposition. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d
1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
124. Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565, 566 (1st Cir. 1971) (citation omitted). The re-
mark caused the Second Circuit to speculate that the First Circuit was retreating
from Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969). See Presidents Council,
Dist. 25 v. Community Sch. Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 294 n.7 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Regardless of whatever hesitation the circuit court may have been
expressing, it affirmed the district court's order issuing the prelimi-
nary injunction and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.
On remand, the district court construed Pickering v. Board of Edu-
cation of Township High School District 205,125 an extracurricular
comment case, and Tinker, a case involving the private speech of stu-
dents, as demonstrating that teachers have free speech rights both in
and out of the classroom although neither case had anything to do
with the classroom speech of teachers. The court then distilled two
distinct rights from Keefe and Parducci.i2 6
The first right was procedural, protecting a teacher from being dis-
charged for using a teaching method that he or she would not have
known was prohibited.127 The second right was substantive, ex-
tending constitutional protection to a teacher's choice of teaching
methods.12s The court, however, stopped short of adopting the sub-
stantive right: "Perhaps, though Keefe and Parducci do not say so, the
school authorities there involved were constitutionally free by express
proscription to forbid the assignment of outside reading of magazine
articles and novels of undoubted merit and propriety for which the
teacher had not secured advance approval."1 29 The court then formu-
lated an awkwardly worded test of its own:
[Tihis court rules that when a secondary school teacher uses a teaching
method which he does not prove has the support of the preponderance opinion
of the teaching profession or of the part of it to which he belongs, but which he
merely proves is relevant to his subject and students, is regarded by experts of
significant standing as serving a serious educational purpose, and was used
by him in good faith the state may suspend or discharge a teacher for using
that method but it may not resort to such drastic sanctions unless the state
proves he was put on notice either by a regulation or otherwise that he should
not have used that method.1 3 0
The court defined this safeguard as an "exclusively procedural pro-
tection ... afforded to a teacher not because he is a state employee, or
because he is a citizen, but because in his teaching capacity he is en-
gaged in the exercise of what may plausibly be considered 'vital First
Amendment rights.'"131
Applying this procedural rule to the facts of the case, the court
stated,
125. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
126. See Mallioux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Mass. 1971), affd per curiam,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
127. See id.
128. See id.; Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
129. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 n.3 (D. Mass. 1971), affd per curiam,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
130. Id. at 1392.
131. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)).
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[t]here is no substantial evidence that [the teacher's] methods were contrary
to an informal rule, to an understanding among school teachers of his school
or teachers generally, to a body of disciplinary precedents generally, to precise
canons of ethics, or to specific opinions expressed in professional journals or
other publications. 132
When the case returned to the First Circuit, the panel began by
denying that its earlier statement regarding Keefe marked a re-
treat.13 3 While the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
it distanced itself from the analysis used by the district court: "[W]e
suspect that any such formulation would introduce more problems
than it would resolve."134 More significantly, the circuit court was un-
able to conclude that the teacher's conduct fell within the protection of
the First Amendment.135 Instead, the court affirmed the lower court's
decision solely on the basis of notice. 136
Although the doctrinal foundations of Keefe, Parducci, and Mail-
loux were built on extrapolations from a student speech case and ex-
tracurricular comment decisions, a line of high school academic
freedom cases quickly attached those cases without any serious exam-
ination as to the strength of the anchor. A federal district court in
Iowa, relying on all three cases, recognized the substantive and proce-
dural rights mentioned by the district court in Mailloux.137 A federal
district court in Texas, again relying on Keefe, Parducci and Mailloux,
then recognized a more limited right of academic freedom in the class-
room.1 38 The Fifth Circuit, however, vacated the district court's deci-
sion, expressly noting that it was not passing judgment on the district
court's constitutional analysis.139 The next year, however, in yet an-
other case, the Fifth Circuit stated, "We thus join the First and Sixth
Circuits in holding that classroom discussion is protected activity,"' 40
despite the fact that the Sixth Circuit case that it cited had not
reached such a conclusion,141 and the First Circuit's position was
132. Id.
133. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971)(per curiam).
134. Id.
135. See id. ("Here, however... we are not of one mind as to whether plaintiffs con-
duct fell within the protection of the First Amendment.").
136. See id.
137. See Webb v. Lake Mills Community Sch. Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 799 (N.D. Iowa
1972).
138. See Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 661 n.1 (S.D. Tex.
1972), vacated, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974)("The freedom of speech of a teacher
and a citizen of the United States must not be so lightly regarded that he stands
in jeopardy of dismissal for raising controversial issues in an eager but disci-
plined classroom.")
139. See Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1974).
140. Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980).
141. See Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976),
which held that the school board violated the First Amendment by removing
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somewhat ambiguous in light of Mailloux.142 The Louisiana Court of
Appeals then relied on Mailloux and Keefe to recognize a right of aca-
demic freedom, but held that a teacher's speech must have "some seri-
ous educational purpose" to receive constitutional protection.143 The
Fourth Circuit, relying on Mailloux, recognized the procedural notice
right of academic freedom, but held that notice was provided by the
statutory grounds for dismissal. 144 Still another federal district court
in Texas, relying on Keefe, Parducci and Mailloux, recognized both the
procedural and substantive rights.145 A federal district court in New
York then recognized a substantive right of academic freedom in the
pedagogical methods used by a teacher, but was somewhat ambiguous
as to the nature of the state interest necessary to overcome the
right.146 Next, the Colorado Supreme Court, relying on many of the
cases mentioned above, stated
[v]arious courts, in the wake of Keyishian, have recognized that a teacher in a
public educational institution has a constitutionally protected First Amend-
ment interest in choosing a particular pedagogical method for presenting the
idea-content of a course, as long as the course is part of the official curriculum
of the educational institution and the teaching method serves a demonstrable
educational purpose.' 4 7
Later, in Watson v. Eagle County School District RE.50,148 the Col-
orado Court of Appeals, taking the substantive right to its logical con-
clusion, held that the faculty advisor to a high school newspaper had a
some books from the library, but not by removing books from the curriculum,
stating
[t]o the extent that this suit concerns a question as to whether the school
faculty may make its professional choice of textbooks prevail over the
considered decision of the Board of Education empowered by state law to
make such decisions, we affirm the decision of the District Judge in dis-
missing that portion of the plaintiffs complaint.
Id. at 579-80.
142. The Kingsville court referred to Keefe as addressing the First Circuit's position,
ignoring Mailloux's later treatment of Keefe and the fact that Mailloux declined
to hold that a teacher's classroom speech is protected by the First Amendment.
See Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971)(per curiam).
143. Simon v. Jefferson Davis Parish Sch. Bd., 289 So.2d 511, 517 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
144. See Frison v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 596 F.2d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1979).
145. See Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
146. See Mahoney v. Hankin, 593 F. Supp. 1171, 1174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
147. State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ. v. Olson, 687 P.2d
429, 437 (Colo. 1984). Notably, the case did not involve a disagreement concern-
ing teaching methodology, but whether a program that the teacher directed
would continue to be funded, an issue which the court acknowledged was left to
the "broad discretion" of administrators. See id. at 438.
148. 797 P.2d 768 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). Watson appears to have been implicitly over-
ruled by a recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court. See Board of Educ. v.
Wilder, 960 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1998).
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constitutional right to publish an article in the student paper despite a
prior directive from her principal not to do so. 14 9
V. HAZELWOOD AND THE REGULATION OF SCHOOL-
SPONSORED SPEECH
What is most surprising about Watson is that the opinion was writ-
ten without reference to a two year old Supreme Court decision with
facts so similar but a conclusion so different that it should have given
the lower court at least some pause. In Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,150 school administrators refused to allow student journal-
ists to publish two articles in the school newspaper, raising the issue
of the extent to which the school could regulate school-sponsored stu-
dent speech.1 5 1 The Court did not apply Tinker's "material and sub-
stantial" disruption standard. Instead, it explained that Tinker
involved "a student's personal expression that happens to occur on
school premises,"15 2  while Hazelwood involved speech that
"Is]tudents, parents, and members of the public might reasonably per-
ceive to bear the imprimatur of the school."15 3 The Court held that in
this setting "[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exer-
cising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."15 4 This standard
is far more deferential to school officials' regulation of speech than
Tinker: essentially, rational basis review in the educational
setting.155
149. See Watson v. Eagle County Sch. Dist. RE-50, 797 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990).
150. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
151. This, of course, is precisely the same question raised by Watson except the chal-
lenge in Watson came from the faculty sponsor of the newspaper, not the students
themselves.
152. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 273.
155. See e.g., United States Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973)(holding
nonsuspect classifications only need be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose).
Legitimate pedagogical interests include prohibiting school-sponsored speech
"that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible
sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social
order,' or to associate the school with any position other than neutrality on mat-
ters of political controversy." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
272 (1988)(citation omitted) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
683 (1986)). See also, Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir.
1991)(holding schools have legitimate pedagogical interest in insuring that
speech of teacher is sufficiently sensitive to privacy interests of students, is not
inappropriate for maturity level, exhibits sound professional judgment, and does
not embarrass students among their peers); Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517,
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While Hazelwood, like Tinker, did not involve the classroom speech
of teachers, the Court noted that so long as school facilities have not
been converted into a public forum, "school officials may impose rea-
sonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other
members of the community."'15 6 Lower courts quickly interpreted this
statement as authorizing school officials to regulate the classroom
speech of teachers so long as the regulations were reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 15 7
This standard was hardly new. The Second Circuit had applied a
similar standard more than fifteen years earlier.15s Comparable stan-
dards also had been invoked in other decisions,159 including Mail-
loUx16 0 and Justice Holmes' dissent in Meyer's companion case.16 1
1523 (11th Cir. 1989)(holding legitimate pedagogical concerns include consider-
ing the sexuality and vulgarity used in texts); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch.
Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 795 (5th Cir. 1989)(holding schools have legitimate pedagogi-
cal interest in shaping their curricula and demanding that teachers adhere to it);
Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Wis. 1995)(holding schools have
legitimate pedagogical interest in not exposing students to nudity, profanity, or
graphic violence); Krizek v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1139 (N.D. Ill.
1989)(holding schools have legitimate pedagogical interest in preventing vulgar-
ity and depictions of sexual conduct).
156. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
157. See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2d
Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver
Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir. 1991); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066,
1074 (11th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1057 n.11 (10th Cir.
1990); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.
1990); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 801 (5th Cir.
1989)(recognizing Hazelwood, but applying Pickering); Virgil v. School Bd., 862
F.2d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1989); Lacks v. Ferguson Reorg. Sch. Dist. R-2, 936
F. Supp. 676, 684 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev'd, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998); Krizek v.
Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Board ofEduc. v. Wilder,
960 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1998). The Hazelwood standard also has been rejected by at
least one court. See Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Va. 1996).
Other courts have resolved such cases without reference to Hazelwood at all. See
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1990); Hosford v.
School Comm., 659 N.E.2d 1178 (Mass. 1996).
158. See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir. 1972)("What we require,
then, is only that rules formulated by school officials be reasonably related to the
needs of the educational process and that any disciplinary action taken pursuant
to those rules have a basis in fact.")
159. See Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 631 (2d Cir. 1972)("Reasonable
regulations designed to effect legitimate purposes, are well within the Board's
power, and will be upheld against challenge, by the courts."); Wilson v. Chancel-
lor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1364 (D. Or. 1976)("[S]chool boards may restrict teachers'
expression if the restrictions are reasonable in light of the special circumstances
of the school environment.")
160. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971)(per curium)("At pres-
ent we see no substitute for a case-by-case inquiry into whether the legitimate
interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a
teacher's speech."); see also Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir.
1998]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
While Hazelwood has become the predominant framework for resolv-
ing high school classroom speech cases, its application has hardly been
uniform, allowing a second strain of academic freedom cases to
develop.
VI. THE SECOND COMING OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM-ALL
PROCEDURE NO SUBSTANCE
The second generation of high school academic freedom cases, like
the first generation, can be traced to the First Circuit. In Ward v.
Hickey, a nontenured teacher's contract was not renewed following her
discussion of aborting fetuses afflicted with Down Syndrome. 162 She
brought suit alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the school district. On review the
First Circuit stated, "we find that a school committee may regulate a
teacher's classroom speech if: (1) the regulation is reasonably related
to a legitimate pedagogical concern, and (2) the school provided the
teacher with notice of what conduct was prohibited."163 The circuit
court cited to Hazelwood for the first proposition, and to Keyishian for
the second, the latter having been decided on vagueness grounds.
The circuit court acknowledged that Hazelwood rejected a constitu-
tional requirement of written regulations, 16 4 but assumed that the
Supreme Court's discussion was limited to prepublication control of
speech, suggesting that the Supreme Court would require notice for
disciplining a teacher after the speech occurred, a suggestion Ward
supported not with citation to Supreme Court authority but to Mail-
loux and Keefe. 16 5
Ward cast its notice requirement in the familiar formula of due
process jurisprudence:
Of course, while we acknowledge a First Amendment right of public school
teachers to know what conduct is proscribed, we do not hold that a school
must expressly prohibit every imaginable inappropriate conduct by teachers.
The relevant inquiry is: based on existing regulations, policies, discussions,
and other forms of communication between school administrators and teach-
1993)("This circuit's test of teachers' speech regulation, as set out in Mailloux, is
consistent with the Supreme Court's test, as set out in Kuhlmeier.")
161. See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting)("No one
would doubt that a teacher might be forbidden to teach many things, and the only
criterion of his liberty under the Constitution that I can think of is whether, con-
sidering the end in view, the statute passes the bounds of reason and assumes the
character of arbitrary fiat.")(quotation omitted)
162. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
163. Id. at 452 (citations omitted).
164. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.6 (1988).
165. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993).
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ers, was it reasonable for the school to expect the teacher to know that her
conduct was prohibited. 1 66
Then, like Justice Fortas in Epperson, the First Circuit rendered
its entire discussion superfluous by acknowledging that the teacher
waived any notice argument. 16 7 The court quickly affirmed the verdict
against the teacher and remanded the case to determine which por-
tion, if any, of the teacher's litigation was frivolous.168
Nevertheless, Ward, like Keefe before it, became the anchor for a
second line of academic freedom cases built on the concept of notice.1 6 9
In Silva v. University of New Hampshire,17o a technical writing in-
structor who had been disciplined for violating the university's sexual
harassment policy brought suit alleging a violation of his First
Amendment rights.171 The allegations seemed fairly damning. Stu-
dents complained about in-class remarks with sexual overtones, in-
cluding a graphic description of sexual intercourse, and a description
of a belly dancer as looking like a plate of Jello stimulated with a vi-
brator.17 2 Students were required to keep a daily log of their activi-
ties, cataloguing "what they did, with whom they did it, as well as
what they thought and dreamed about."1 73 The instructor requested
and retained personal information from students ostensibly for a re-
search project, but for which he had not obtained informed consent.174
When an alternate section was set up for students who objected to the
instructor's classes, twenty-six students transferred.175
166. Id. at 454. Compare Connaally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)(holding a statute fails to provide constitutionally adequate notice where
persons of ordinary intelligence would have to guess at its meaning).
167. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454-55 (1st Cir. 1993).
168. See id. at 455-56.
169. See infra notes 170-82, 193-94 and accompanying text. The notice requirement
has not been uniformly accepted. The Second Circuit, relying on the same pas-
sage from Hazelwood that the First Circuit distinguished in Ward, held that no-
tice was not a prerequisite for imposing discipline on a teacher for his or her
classroom presentation. See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. Of
Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2nd Cir. 1994). In addition, prior to Ward, the Tenth
Circuit upheld a school district's imposition of sanctions against a teacher for
classroom speech in circumstances where the teacher had little reason to know
that his speech would lead to sanctions. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d
773 (10th Cir. 1991).
170. 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 306.
173. Id. at 307.
174. See id.
175. See id. A university appeals panel found that the teacher made a number of inap-
propriate remarks including remarking to a female student who was on her
knees, "[ilt looks like you've had a lot of experience down there." Id. at 310. The
district court, however, suspected that the panel was contaminated by the bias
because during the university hearing, a panel member admonished the instruc-
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Nevertheless, the district court enjoined the university from disci-
plining the instructor, finding on the basis of Ward, a First Amend-
ment violation.1 76  Specifically, the court concluded that the
university's sexual harassment policy did not preclude verbal conduct
that was not of a sexual nature. Then, addressing only the instruc-
tor's description of a belly dancer, and not the other incidents, the
court stated that "the six complainants who were offended by [the
statement] were under the mistaken impression that the word 'vibra-
tor' necessarily connotes a sexual device."i 7 7 Therefore, the court con-
cluded the notice requirement was not satisfied.17s
Ward's notice requirement proved to be pivotal in a decision by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, holding that a school board
violated the First Amendment by refusing to rehire a nontenured
teacher following a short classroom discussion about profanities in-
cluding the term "fuck."179
While the court professed to avoid the issue of academic freedom
and resolve the case in terms of traditional First Amendment princi-
ples,180 its conclusion was not framed by reference to any traditional
free speech doctrine, but was based upon its determination of what
constituted proper pedagogy:
[Tihe case comes down to the single issue whether the decision first to disci-
pline and then to take an unfavorable personnel action against Hosford be-
cause of that one brief class segment violated her constitutional rights. We
are certain it did. The distinction between what the defendants concede was
pedagogically valid at the beginning of that brief segment and the continua-
tion of that same discussion for a few minutes more ... is so insubstantial as
to justify characterizing it as arbitrary and capricious. i 8 1
This passage would seem to dispose of the case, but the court
hedged its position, stating that if there had been a policy flatly
prohibiting the use of such words, "we might conclude that [the
teacher] was bound to respect it on pain of the very consequences that
were visited upon her."1 2 Thus, the court appeared to hold that arbi-
trary restrictions on speech are permissible so long as they are memo-
rialized, creating a strong sense that the court was more concerned
with employment protections than speech protections.
Later that same year in Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School Dis-
trict R-2,is3 Hazelwood was converted into a balancing test.1 8 4 The
tor when, following a student's statement that not every household has Jello or a
vibrator, the instructor audibly remarked, "[e]specially Jello." Id. at 309, 324.
176. See id. at 312-13.
177. Id. at 313.
178. See id.
179. See Hosford v. School Comm., 659 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (Mass. 1996).
180. See id. at 1180.
181. Id. at 1182.
182. Id.
183. 936 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev'd, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998).
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case involved a teacher who was dismissed for allowing students to
use what the school district termed "excessive profanity" in plays writ-
ten and performed by the students.18 5 The court stated,
Hazelwood contains the appropriate legal standard to apply in this case: Was
defendant's termination of plaintiff reasonably related to legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns? Application of this legal standard will inherently require the
appropriate balance of the school's interest in prohibiting profanity and the
teacher's interest in using the teaching method at issue in this case .... 186
Hazelwood, of course, contemplates categorization, not balancing,
i.e., if the reason forwarded by supervising educators can be catego-
rized as being reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,
the inquiry is over.1 8 7
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, but without ex-
pressly addressing the notion that Hazelwood becomes a balancing
test when applied to teachers.' 8 8 Instead, the court viewed the case
as involving a teacher's failure to enforce the school district's policy
regarding the use of profanity.' 8 9 Thus, the policy regulating profan-
ity, not the teacher's failure to enforce the policy, was the subject of
First Amendment scrutiny. Once the policy was validated, the court,
without expressly stating so, treated the teacher's failure to follow it
as if no First Amendment issue was raised at all.19 0 As to the notice
argument, the court took note of the First Circuit's decision in
Ward,'9 ' but held that the teacher had been given adequate notice.'
9 2
184. See id.
185. See id. at 678. The profanities included "nigger," "bitch," "ass," "shit," and, of
course, "fuck." While the discussion in the text focuses on issues related to
Parducci, the Lacks court drew Ward, and thereby Keefe, into the analysis. See
id. at 684-85.
186. Id. at 684 (citations omitted). Moreover, the court interpreted Hazelwood as re-
quiring that courts consider the severity of the sanction imposed for violating an
otherwise legitimate restriction. See id. The notion that the First Amendment is
concerned not only with the reasonableness of regulations, but the reasonable-
ness of sanctions imposed for violating those regulations confuses the First
Amendment with the Due Process Clause.
187. Accord Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990)("It is of course
true, as plaintiffs so forcefully point out, that Lysistrata and The Miller's Tale are
widely acclaimed masterpieces of Western literature. However, after careful con-
sideration, we cannot conclude that the school board's actions [in removing the
books from the approved reading list] were not reasonably related to its legiti-
mate concerns (for this high school audience) of the sexuality and vulgarity in
these works.")
188. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Circ. 1998).
189. See id. at 724.
190. See id. at 724.
191. See id. at 723.
192. See id. The teacher in Lacks, unlike the teacher in Ward, had achieved tenure
which would have entitled her to the due process protections of notice without
reliance on the First Amendment.
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The following year, the Colorado Court of Appeals converted the
objective notice requirement of Ward into a subjective test in Wilder v.
Board of Education of Jefferson County School District.193 There, a
teacher failed to abide by the school district's policy that required
teachers to confer with the principal before using a controversial
learning resource; in this case, an R-rated movie that contained scenes
of explicit sexuality, nudity, violence, and repeated profanities. While
the court acknowledged that other teachers had discussed the need for
prior approval in the teacher's presence, and that a faculty meeting
had been held to discuss the procedures that were used prior to show-
ing the R-rated Schindler's List, it held "[w]e conclude that, absent a
finding that [the teacher] had actual knowledge of that policy or that
the policy was contained in some document that [the teacher] was re-
quired by Board policy to read, the board's decision was arbitrary and
capricious and cannot stand."194
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the lower court, applying a
straightforward Hazelwood analysis.19 5 The Court treated the notice
issue as one involving due process concerns, not the First Amendment,
and held that publication satisfied due process. 19 6
Perhaps the most significant development arose in the Fourth Cir-
cuit where a panel reversed the dismissal of a drama teacher's claim
that she had been deprived of her First Amendment rights because
she was transferred after having her students stage a play that some
members of the school community considered unsuited for a high
school production. 19 7 The court applied Hazelwood, but held that Ha-
zelwood is not amendable to resolving cases in the context of a motion
to dismiss where only the teacher's allegations, not the school dis-
trict's justifications are before the court.' 98
Reviewing the case en banc, the full circuit held in a 7-6 vote that
Hazelwood did not supply the controlling test, but that the Pickering!
Connick line of cases should be applied.199 Under Pickering, a court
must first decide whether the teacher's speech involves a matter of
public concern, and if so, then move to a balancing test to weigh the
193. 944 P.2d 598 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd, 960 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1998).
194. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
195. See Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 705-06 (Colo. 1998). As in Lacks, the
teacher had earned tenure, and therefore could claim the protection of notice on
due process grounds.
196. See id. at 705; see also Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474,
(4th Cir. 1996), rev'd en banc, 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998).
197. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474, 1478-79 (4th Cir.
1996).
198. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998)(en
banc)(relying on Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir.
1989)).
199. See id. at 368; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
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teacher's interest in speaking out against the school's interest in con-
ducting its educational mission without disruption.20 0 While other
courts have found the classroom statements of teachers to be matters
of public concern, the Fourth Circuit, relying on an earlier Fifth Cir-
cuit case, Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District,201 found
that the teacher's curricular speech was not a matter of public concern
and therefore not entitled to any First Amendment protection.2 02 On
its face the court's conclusion seems completely incongruous; how
could public education not be a matter of public concern? The Fifth
Circuit's explanation is more precise than the Fourth's: "Issues do not
rise to the level of public concern by virtue of the speaker's interest in
the subject matter; rather they achieve that protected status if the
words or conduct are conveyed by the teacher in his role as a citizen
and not in his role as an employee of the school district."2 03
The Boring court's decision suddenly refocused the argument. It
was no longer how Hazelwood should be applied, but whether it
should be applied. Hazelwood is predicated on the assumption that
when a teacher stands before a high school audience, his or her exer-
cise of state power is clothed with at least some measure of constitu-
tional protection. It is time to examine whether this proposition is
true.
VII. WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS
The Supreme Court appears to have had something to say about
the issue:
When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is
the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate
the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it
enlists private entities to convey its own message. In the same vein, in Rust v.
Sullivan... [w]e recognized that when the government appropriates govern-
ment funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes. 2 0 4
200. See Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2nd Cir. 1994)(teacher's in-class speech
on public policy issues is matter of public concern); Birdwell v. Hazelwood Sch.
Dist., 491 F.2d 490, 493 (8th Cir. 1974)(court assumed without elaboration that
teacher's classroom remarks were matter of public concern); Scallet v. Rosen-
blum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996)(instructor's classroom speech mat-
ter of public concern); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407
(C.D. Cal. 1995)(college professor's in-class speech matter of public concern).
201. 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989).
202. See Boring v. Buncombe County Sch. Dist., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
203. Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798-99 (5th Cir. 1989)(em-
phasis in original).
204. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2518
(1995)(citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
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This passage comes from Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia,20 5 which to be sure, was a public forum case,
not an academic freedom case. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court drew
a distinction of constitutional significance between persons using uni-
versity resources for private expression and persons speaking on be-
half of the university itself. The Court's reference to Rust v.
Sullivan2 06 emphasized this point. Rust squarely addressed the issue
of the extent to which the government could regulate the speech of
persons speaking on its behalf.207 Rust involved a challenge to regula-
tions adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services that
prohibited recipients of Title X funding from discussing abortion as a
family planning method. The regulations were challenged as an im-
permissible viewpoint-based restriction on speech. According to Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, however, neither viewpoint dis-
crimination nor the First Amendment were involved. The government
had "merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other,"2 08 i.e., the government's decision to say one thing but not an-
other is no concern of the First Amendment.
The Court recognized that "[t]he employees' freedom of expression
is limited during the time that they actually work for the project; but
this limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employment
in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding
authority,"2 09 reasoning that sounds much like Justice Holmes' expla-
nation of the relationship between police officers and politics. In Rust,
however, participation in the program was not conditioned upon what
a physician said outside the program. Instead, participation in the
program was conditioned upon complying with the mission of the pro-
gram itself. To reduce the Rust Court's reasoning to Justice Holmes'
epigram: A police officer may have a right to criticize Miranda v. Ari-
zona,21 0 but he still has to read suspects their rights.211 Viewed in
this manner, Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning is consistent with
Justice Brennan's footnote in Edwards regarding academic freedom,
Justice Black's concurrence in Epperson, and the Tennessee Supreme
Court's reasoning in Scopes.
The political backdrop for Rust succeeded in making the case more
controversial than its reasoning. The case is best explained by
recoguzing a straightforward point: the First Amendment does not re-
quire the government to speak out of both sides of its mouth, i.e.,
205. Id. at 2510.
206. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
207. See id.
208. Id. at 193.
209. Id. at 199.
210. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
211. See id.
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where the government has to make a choice as to what will be said, it
is allowed to make and enforce that choice. The Reagan administra-
tion deliberately chose not to give voice to a viewpoint that it found
distasteful. In the context of public forum jurisprudence, this sort of
picking and choosing is not tolerated even in nonpublic forums where
the government's ability to regulate private speech is the strongest. 21 2
The Court, of course, did not treat the federally-sponsored program as
any sort of public forum. Instead, the Court treated the program as
embodying the speech of the government, holding that the First
Amendment is not implicated by the government's decision to say one
thing, but not another, and by requiring its representatives to abide
by the decision that has been made.2 ' 3
Thus, while the ideological gerry-rigging of medical advice in Rust
is subject to attack on many fronts, the legal framework of the decision
was neither new,2 14 and in hindsight perhaps not particularly contro-
versial. As Robert Post has since observed, "when the government is
authorized to act in its own name as a representative of the commu-
nity, its decision to promote one value cannot by itself carry an inter-
nal constitutional compulsion to simultaneously support other
values."2 15
The process of deciding what the government shall say is not a con-
stitutional issue, but is left to the political process. While the Consti-
tution places certain speech options, such as endorsing or denigrating
religious beliefs, beyond the reach of the political process, 21 6 the Con-
212. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-
93 (1993); Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
Many courts and commentators have fallen into the increasingly strong gravita-
tional pull of public forum jurisprudence by inquiring whether the classroom is a
public or nonpublic forum. See Miles. v. Denver Pub. Sch. 944 F.2d 773, 776 (10th
Cir. 1991)(teacher's expression during class "must be treated as school-sponsored
expression in a nonpublic forum"); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 918 F.
Supp. 838, 844 (W.D. Pa. 1996)("A public high school classroom is a nonpublic
form."); see also Clarick, supra note 7, at 715-17 (discussing classroom as a non-
public forum). Rosenberger, however, draws a clear distinction between a public
forum created by university resources and the speech of the university itself. See
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2518
(1995). Public forum doctrine sets the rules that the government must follow
when it allows private citizens access to public facilities for private speech. See
Lamb's Chapel 508 U.S. 384 (nonpublic forum case involving private use of public
facility); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (same). It does not intrude into the poli-
cymaking process used to determine what the government will say.
213. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
214. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 405 (1984)(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
215. Post, supra note 36, at 184 (emphasis deleted).
216. See Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2446
(1995).
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stitution has nothing to say about which constitutionally permissible
speech option the political process ultimately must select.
VIII. BACK TO THE CLASSROOM
While Keyishian observed that the classroom is "peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas,"2 17 this observation does not address the ques-
tion of who gets to stock the shelves of the market. The public school
classroom is most assuredly not an open market. Only teachers, i-
censed by the state, are allowed to take the podium and speak. The
citizens gathered before them are there under force of mandatory at-
tendance laws. Dissenting members of the community have no right
of access to this audience. Dissenting students have no constitutional
right to opt out of a curriculum with which they disagree, 2 18 nor do
they have an individual right that the curriculum be tailored to their
beliefs.2 19 Instead, dissenting students and parents have a collective
right to seek a change in the curriculum through the democratic pro-
cess, a right shared equally with teachers.2 20
The speech of a public school teacher is unquestionably an exercise
of state power. If it were not, there would be no violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause when a teacher attempts to use the classroom to for-
ward his or her religious beliefs.221 The question of how state power
will be exercised is answered by reference to state law. 22 2 Generally,
217. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
218. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987)(hold-
ing that mere disagreement with ideas presented does not entitle students to opt
out of curricula).
219. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996)(re-
jecting student/parent challenge to participation in school district's mandatory
community service program); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d.
Cir. 1996)(same); Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21,980 F.2d 437 (7th
Cir. 1992)(holding that student who objects to reciting the Pledge of Allegiance
has no right to demand that others do not recite it in his presence).
220. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
221. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)(holding that state-subsidized
teachers may not inculcate religious beliefs); Helland v. South Bend Comm. Sch.
Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996)(holding that state-subsidized teachers
may not inculcate religious beliefs); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37
F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994)(stating "[t]o permit [the teacher] to discuss his reli-
gious beliefs with students during school time on school grounds would violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment"). While a concurring judge in
Boring tried to draw a distinction between the curricular classroom speech of
teachers and their noncurricular classroom speech, Boring v. Buncombe County
Board of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 372 (4th Cir. 1998)(Luttig, J., concurring), as a
practical matter there may be no pen fine enough to draw this line. See generally,
Macarena Hernandez, Fired Teacher Is Stunned by Furor Over School Prayer,
N.Y. TimEs, June 30, 1998, at A21(describing dismissal of a teacher for violating
school policy against religious prostylization).
222. See e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988).
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state law makes the local board of education the final decisionmaking
authority for matters of curriculum. 223 To date, the Supreme Court
has recognized only Establishment Clause limitations upon what may
or may not be taught in public schools. 2 24 Beyond the Establishment
Clause limitations, the Court has stated that members of a school
board "might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters
of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community
values." 2 2 5
So where does this leave high school academic freedom?
IX. THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Notwithstanding the broad statements of cases like Parducci, the
substantive right of academic freedom has been overwhelmingly re-
jected.226 Indeed, courts were rejecting this right while the Keefe /
223. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)("By and large, public educa-
tion in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities."); see
also COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15 (1973)(vesting control of instruction in local
boards of education).
224. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffxee, 472 U.S. 38
(1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968). As a result, it is not unfounded to state, as the Seventh Circuit has, that
the Establishment Clause provides the only limitation on a board's authority to
set curriculum. See Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437,
445 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
1058, 1073 (6th Cir. 1987)(Bogg, J., concurring).
225. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982). Few doubt, however, that the
First Amendment would be powerless to prevent a school board from striking all
favorable references to one political party from textbooks. Nonetheless, this does
not answer the question of who would suffer the First Amendment violation,
state actors or the victims of state action. In these circumstances the students'
right to acquire knowledge, certainly an aspect of academic freedom, that was
articulated in Pico, would expand beyond the school library. See id. at 866-67. In
Pico, where the Supreme Court placed limitations on a school board's authority to
remove books from the school library, the right ran to the students, not to the
librarian. See id.
226. See Edwards v. California Univ. of Pennsylvania, 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3rd Cir.
1998)("[A] public university professor does not have a first amendment right to
decide what will be taught in the classroom."); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of
Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998)(en banc)([We are of opinion that [the
teacher] had no First Amendment right to insist on the makeup of the curricu-
lum"); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992)(lis Court has recog-
nized the supremacy of the academic institution in matters of curriculum
content."); Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 439 (7th
Cir. 1992)('The right of the school board to decide what the pupils are taught
implies a corresponding right to require teachers to act accordingly."); Bishop v.
Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1077 (11th Cir. 1991)(-Ihe University's conclusions about
course content must be allowed to hold sway over an individual professor's judg-
ments."); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (7th
Cir. 1990)(First Amendment does not authorize teachers to ignore curricula or
directives of supervisors); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176
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Parducci/Mailloux line of cases was developing.227 Moreover, subse-
quent decisions of the Supreme Court, have deprived Parducci's sub-
stantive right of virtually all support.
Recognizing a substantive right of academic freedom would effec-
tively reverse the polarity of state power, allowing the decisions of
subordinates to prevail over the decisions of their supervisors. Ulti-
mately, the substantive right fails for a very basic reason: the Consti-
(3rd Cir. 1990)(teacher has no right of academic freedom that extends to the
choice of classroom management techniques); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch.
Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989)("We hold only that public school teachers
are not free, under the first amendment, to arrogate control of curricula."); Love-
lace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir. 1986)("The first
amendment does not require that each nontenured professor be made a sovereign
unto himself."); Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1273 (7th Cir.
1979)(teachers do not have a constitutional right to disregard the valid dictates of
their superiors); Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979)("Mhe
teachers want to be freed from the 'personal predilections' of the board. We do
not see a basis in the constitution to grant their wish."); East Hartford Educ.
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 857 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1977)("This final claim
does not implicate the First Amendment. It is merely an assertion that one
teaching technique is to be preferred over another."); Minarcini v. Strongsville
City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1976)("Clearly, discretion as to the
selection of textbooks must be lodged somewhere and we can find no federal con-
stitutional prohibition which prevents its being lodged in school board officials
who are elected representatives of the people."); Adams v. Campbell County Sch.
Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 1975)("In the case at bar the teaching meth-
ods of [the teachers] may have had educational value as the expert testified, but
this is not equivalent to saying that they had a constitutional right absolute in
character to employ their methods in preference to more standard or orthodox
ones."); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1973)("Whatever may be
the ultimate scope of the amorphous 'academic freedom' guaranteed to our Na-
tion's teachers and students, it does not encompass the right of a nontenured
teacher to have her teaching style insulated from review by her superiors
.... ")(citations omitted); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972)
("[Tihe teacher] has cited no sound authority for his proposition that he had a
constitutional right to override the wishes and judgment of his superiors .... ");
Ahern v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1972)("Miss Ahern was
invested by the Constitution with no right.., to persist in a course of teaching
behavior which contravened the valid dictates of her employers, the public school
board, regarding classroom method ... ."); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub.
Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838, 844 (W.D. Pa. 1996)(teacher does not have constitutional
right to select classroom management technique prohibited by administrators);
Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 704 P.2d 213, 216 (Alaska
1985)(when teacher and administrator disagree as to curricular content, adminis-
trator prevails); Millikan v. Board of Dir., 611 P.2d 414, 417 (Wash. 1980).
227. See Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); East Hartford Educ.
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2nd Cir. 1977); Minarcini v. Strongville
City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Campbell County Sch.
Dist., 511 F.2d 1742 (10th Cir. 1975); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.
1973); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972); Ahern v. Board of Educ.,
456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); see also supra note 212 and cases cited therein.
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tution limits state power, it does not allocate state power to persons of
its own choosing.
While there may be circumstances that justify creating this warp
in state power in the university setting, the theory underlying aca-
demic freedom was not developed for the pedagogical model repre-
sented by the public schools. The high school is not the university writ
small and failure to take full account of the differences between the
two settings is a disservice to the university, diminishing its unique
function and independence. 228
Even when courts do not ignore the differences between the univer-
sity and the high school setting, they tend to focus on only the obvious
differences, not necessarily the most important ones. A surprisingly
harsh summary of the obvious differences can be found in Mailloux:
The secondary school more clearly than the college or university acts in loco
parentis with respect to minors. It is closely governed by a school board se-
lected by a local community. The faculty does not have the independent tradi-
tions, the broad discretion as to teaching methods, nor usually the intellectual
qualifications, of university professors. Among secondary school teachers
there are often many persons with little experience. Some teachers and most
students have limited intellectual and emotional maturity. Most parents, stu-
dents, school boards, and members of the community usually expect the secon-
dary school to concentrate on transmitting basic information, teaching 'the
best that is known and thought in the world,' training by established tech-
niques, and, to some extent at least, indoctrinating in the mores of the sur-
rounding society. While secondary schools are not rigid disciplinary
institutions, neither are they open forums in which mature adults, already
habituated to social restraints, exchange ideas on a level of parity. Moreover,
it cannot be accepted as a premise that the student is voluntarily in the class-
room and willing to be exposed to a teaching method which, though reason-
able, is not approved by the school authorities or by the weight of professional
opinion. A secondary school student, unlike most college students, is usually
required to attend school classes, and may have no choice as to his teacher.
2 29
The most important difference, however, is the educational model
applicable to each setting. Academic freedom arose not to mandate
ideological diversity in proprietary institutions-which, after all,
would interfere with the ideological freedom of those institutions-but
to protect the ability of scholars at true universities to challenge ex-
isting knowledge without fear of sanction from those outside the aca-
demic community. The production of scholarship does not fall within
the job description of high school teachers. Instead, the Supreme
Court has described public schools in terms that are reminiscent of the
AAUP's description of "proprietary institutions":
228. See Byrne, supra note 7, at 288 n.137 (arguing that a clear distinction should be
kept between claims of academic freedom by university professors and school
teachers).
229. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971), affd per curiam, 448
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
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We have ... acknowledged that public schools are vitally important 'in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,' and as vehicles for 'in-
culcating fimdamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system.' We are therefore in full agreement with petitioners that lo-
cal school boards must be permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum
in such a way as to transmit community values,' and that 'there is a legitimate
and substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and
traditional values be they social, moral, or political.'2 3 0
The Court also has recognized the pivotal role that teachers play in
the success of this process:
[A] teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but im-
portant influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, through both the
presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the
political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. 2 3 1
Given the importance of this function, the notion that a teacher is
authorized to exercise state authority in a manner of his or her own
choosing misapprehends academic freedom, misunderstands the Con-
stitution and generally tilts at windmills. It misapprehends academic
freedom because it mistakes one educational model for another. It
misunderstands the Constitution because it treats the First Amend-
ment as a delegation of state power. And finally, it tilts at windmills
because while the evil imagined is a school system turned into an ideo-
logical empire, ideology is almost never at issue in high school aca-
230. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)(Brennan, J., plurality)(citations
and quotations omitted); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)("The
importance of public schools in the preparation as citizens, and in the preserva-
tion of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our
decisions."); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953)("[Public educa-
tion] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in pre-
paring him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment."); Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300,
1305 (7th Cir. 1980)(citation omitted) ("[It is in general permissible and appro-
priate for local boards to make educational decisions based upon their personal
social, political and moral views."); Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543
(10th Cir. 1979)(citation omitted)("It is legitimate for the curriculum of the school
district to reflect the value system and educational emphasis which are the collec-
tive will of those whose children are being educated and who are paying the
costs.")
Nonetheless, courts often retreat to the rhetoric of Keyishian that the First
Amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See Dube v.
State Univ. of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 598 (2d Cir. 1990)(quoting Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)); Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp.,
631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980)(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967)); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1014 (W.D. Va.
1996)(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)). This passage
from Keyishian, however, hardly forwards the analysis. Are schools free to incul-
cate orthodox values, but constitutionally forbidden from doing an effective job of
it? If the constitutional critical mass is a "pall," how is such a thing measured?
231. Ambach v. Norwidk, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979).
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demic freedom cases. More often, the dispute is over the use of
profanity, hardly the stuff for which Socrates died.232 The issues
presented in high school academic freedom cases do not require tech-
nical expertise or detailed knowledge of a discrete field. Instead, the
questions generally involve value-based decisions that require a sense
of the community. These are precisely the questions that are best re-
solved through the democratic process. So long as the local board's
choices do not intrude on the constitutional rights of students, limited
perhaps exclusively to rights under the Religion Clauses, there is no
reason for courts to intrude into disagreements between state actors
as to which constitutionally permissible form of expression is the most
appropriate choice.
Two primary arguments are raised in favor of vesting high school
teachers with preeminent authority over the classroom, one prescrip-
tive, the other proscriptive. The proscriptive argument is that by dele-
gating state authority to individuals, we diminish the power of the
schools to impose a unitary view on students. Besides its awkward
constitutional structure, this argument is flawed on a number of
fronts. First, students are expected to emerge from secondary school
with a sense of, and respect for, the values of the community.233
Second, the argument overestimates the ability of schools to work
their will. Tinker's reminder that students do not shed their constitu-
tional rights at the school house gate, makes us forget what happens
to students' constitutional rights when they exit the gate. Beyond the
school yard are a number of voices competing for their attention: par-
ents, siblings, friends, and the roar of popular culture, all protected by
a powerful and free-ranging First Amendment. While this unitary
view argument is fueled by our fear of Big Brother, Big Brother never
had to compete with the likes of John Lennon, Johnny Rotten, or
Tupac Shakur. So long as the First Amendment remains vital, there
never will be a shortage of persons reminding students that school offi-
cials, teachers included, do not have a monopoly on moral rectitude. 23 4
232. See Fowler v. Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1987); Martin v. Parish, 805
F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Lacks
v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 936 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev'd,
147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998); Krizek v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Webb v. Lake Mills Community Sch. Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa
1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971), affd per curiam, 448
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970);
Hosford v. School Comm., 659 N.E. 2d 1178 (Mass. 1996); Board of Educ. v. Wil-
der, 960 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1998).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 230-33; Yudof, supra note 7, at 849 ("[The
very mission of public schools is to indoctrinate.")
234. See generally Paul Simon, Kodachrome (1973)("When I think back on all the crap
I learned in high school, it's a wonder I can think at all.")
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A third problem with the proscriptive argument is that the First
Amendment is brutally strong medicine. In the eyes of the First
Amendment, the racist tract, THE TURNER DIARIES, 2 3 5 is the equal of
Ralph Ellison's INVISIBLE MAN.236 If we incorporate the First Amend-
ment into the classroom in its full vigor 23 7 at the invitation of a single
person, hateful voices would gain entry to a room where listeners are
not permitted to leave. To prevent this, we would have to create a
First Amendment Lite which tolerates some ideas, but not others.
This, of course, returns us to the original dilemma: who decides what
viewpoints are appropriate for the classroom?
The prescriptive argument is the mirror image to the proscriptive
argument: delegating state curricular authority to individuals pre-
serves democracy which thrives on a diversity of ideas. This argu-
ment, however, contains the same flaws as the proscriptive argument.
Public schools serve an inculcative function. There is no shortage of
diverse voices speaking to students. And someone has to decide what
values are to be conveyed in the classroom. While vesting this deci-
sion in individuals might seem like diversity, it would not feel like
diversity to the students in the classroom dominated by the
teacher. 238 Finally, the prescriptive argument carries with it the odd
assertion that democracy is served by removing democracy from the
educational decisionmaking process. One virtue of the board of educa-
tion system is that when dissenting parents assert that the school cur-
riculum offends their sensibilities, 23 9 the curriculum has been
legitimized through the democratic process. 24 0 While the curriculum
may not suit parents or teachers who have not prevailed in the polit-
ical process, losing in the marketplace of ideas is a routine experience
in a democracy.
Some courts have articulated an abbreviated substantive right of
academic freedom authorizing teachers not to set, but to implement,
235. ANDREW MAcDONALD, THE TURNER DIARIES (1980).
236. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952).
237. See Clarick, supra note 7, at 717-20 (arguing that viewpoint discrimination is
never an appropriate pedagogical end).
238. See Goldstein, supra note 7, at 1343 ("If the purpose of teaching is to instill val-
ues, there would seem to be little reason for the teacher, rather than an elected
school board or other governmental body ultimately responsible to the public, to
be the one who chooses the values to be instilled.")
239. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. Of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir
1996); Immerato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2nd Cir. 1996).
240. See Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir.
1992)(citation omitted)("Goverment... retains the right to set the curriculum in
its own schools and insist that those who cannot accept the result exercise their
right under Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and select private education at their own
expense. The private market supports a profusion of schools, many tailored to
religious or cultural minorities, making the majoritarian curriculum of the public
schools less oppressive.")
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the curriculum in a manner of their own choosing. 241 This abbrevi-
ated right, however, is subject to the same critique as the broader
right. If the Constitution plays no favorites in large pedagogical dis-
agreements (setting the curriculum), there is little basis for asserting
that it picks the winners in small pedagogical disagreements (imple-
menting the curriculum). In addition, given that this right protects
only methodology, not ideology, the ideological diversity argument of-
fers no support for the right. Finally, the abbreviated right ignores
that the most passionate debates in modern education are not over
what will be taught, but how it will be taught.242
X. THE PROCEDURAL RIGHT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: CAN
THERE BE PROCEDURE WITHOUT SUBSTANCE?
While courts generally have rejected the substantive right of aca-
demic freedom, the procedural right of notice shows remarkable per-
sistence. The unexamined issue here is from where does this right
arise?
Even courts that recognize the procedural right concede that teach-
ers do not have a substantive speech right.243 Instead, the procedural
right reflects a due process concern.244 Due process, however, is not a
self-executing right. Instead, there must be a constitutionally pro-
tected interest which due process safeguards. 2 45 Generally, once
teachers have served a certain period of time, state law confers a prop-
erty interest in continued employment protected by the Due Process
Clause, and with it, the requirement of notice. Thus, when a tenured
teacher is being dismissed, notice is a constitutional requirement
wholly apart from the First Amendment.
241. See e.g., State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ. v. Olson, 687
P.2d 429, 437 (Colo. 1984).
242. See generally Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 910 F.2d 1172 (3rd Cir.
1990)(teacher sought right to implement classroom management techniques of
her choosing); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838, 844
(W.D. Pa. 1996) (same); see also Nicholas Lemann, The Reading Wars, ATLANTic
MONTHLY, Nov. 1, 1997 at 128 (describing the debate in California over the use of
phonics and/or whole language reading methodologies).
243. See Hosford v. School Comm., 659 N.E. 2d 1178, 1182 (Mass. 1996); Mailloux v.
Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971)(per curiam).
244. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1177 (3d Cir.
1990)("Although [the teacher] couches her claim in First Amendment terms, her
argument is basically a due process one."); Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243
(1st Cir. 1971)(per curium)(Sanctions in this circumstance would be a denial of
due process.")
245. See e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Not surprisingly then,
academic freedom cases often involve untenured teachers who do not have a prop-
erty interest in continued employment. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass.
Univ., 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.
1973); Krizek v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Hosford v.
School Comm., 659 N.E.2d 1178 (Mass. 1996).
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School districts may refuse to renew the contracts of untenured
teachers for any or no reason and wholly without notice. 2 46 Under the
procedural right, however, a school district cannot release a nonten-
ured teacher, or impose a sanction short of dismissal upon a tenured
teacher, for something he or she said in the classroom unless the
teacher was adequately appraised that the statement would lead to
discipline. Indeed, if the procedural right is a speech-based right, then
school authorities would not be able to issue a disciplinary memo to a
tenured teacher or choose not to renew the contract of an untenured
teacher, absent prior notice, for any of the following reasons:
The teacher's statement of class objectives was not sufficiently specific;
The teacher referred to a student's older sibling as an example of someone
with little ambition or promise; or
The teacher delivered a history lesson that was not sufficiently sensitive to the
concerns of minority students.
In each of these circumstances, employment decisions are based
on speech. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that courts would intervene in
these circumstances.
So what gives courts the impetus and, more important, the author-
ity, to intervene in academic freedom cases? As to the issue of author-
ity, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invoked the
procedural right through simple assertion: "In this case.., what is in
issue is quite straightforwardly an attempt by government officers to
punish a person for what that person has said, and this squarely im-
plicates the First Amendment."24 7
The court's point, however, is more straightforward than accurate.
We routinely punish people for things they say without so much as a
wink at the First Amendment. Conspiracy, price fixing,2 48 sexual har-
assment, 24 9 extortion, 2 50 blackmail, 25 1 and threatening the President
of the United States,2 52 all punish people for things they say, yet the
First Amendment is not implicated because conduct that is otherwise
sanctionable does not become constitutionally protected merely be-
cause it is effected through speech.2 5 3 The illustrations offered above
reflect poor judgment on the part of the teacher and poor judgment
manifested through speech is not entitled to any greater constitu-
tional dignity than poor judgment manifested thorugh action.
246. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283
(1977).
247. Hosford v. School Comm., 659 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (Mass. 1996).
248. See Federal Trade Comm'n v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
431 (1990).
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
250. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962).
251. See id.
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994).
253. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
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Teaching is an occupation effected through speech. Indeed, the nor-
mal operations of schools would be rife with First Amendment horror
shows if only the First Amendment applied.254 Teachers are routinely
required to have their lesson plans approved in advance: prior re-
straints. They are often called upon to teach from a text with which
they have a measure of disagreement: coerced speech. And, of course,
viewpoint discrimination is rampant: humans evolved from lower spe-
cies; the Holocaust did occur, and racial stereotyping is bad.
At what point then does an occupation effected through speech be-
come a constitutionally protected activity? If viewpoint discrimination
is impermissible, then the constitution creates a "balanced treatment
act" for virtually every aspect of the curriculum. If speech that reflects
poor teaching, and therefore poor conduct, is the line of demarcation,
the line is more illusory than real.
In practice, the procedural right arises only in cases that feel like
First Amendment cases. Suppose that precisely the same incident
that occurred in Hosford, where the teacher's contract was not re-
newed after a brief classroom discussion concerning the word "fuck,"
occurred in a second school district. Here, however, the school board
recognized that the teacher was faced with a difficult situation and
her use of profanity, while unfortunate, was not serious enough to
merit even mild discipline. Nevertheless, the board felt that it could
find a teacher who would respond more gracefully in difficult situa-
tions. Therefore, it declined to renew the teacher's contract in the
hope that the school district could find a candidate who is quicker on
her feet.
As in Hosford, the board's decision is based entirely on the board's
assessment of what the teacher said in the classroom. Moreover, in
the hypothetical situation, the teacher would have the same basis for
arguing that she had little reason to know that her speech would
cause the board to look for another candidate. Nevertheless, it is
doubtful that a court would intervene in this second scenario. Yet, if
knowledge of what speech might diminish one's chances of being re-
hired is the object to be protected, then the teacher should be entitled
to reinstatement.
The easy distinction to make is that the hypothetical board's deci-
sion was based on a performative aspect of teaching, which, of course,
feels like conduct for which the First Amendment offers no protec-
tion.2 55 In contrast, the board's decision in Hosford was based on op-
254. See Yudof, supra note 7, at 838-39 ("Or consider the postal employee who em-
braces the constitutional right to be rude to patrons by eschewing regulations
requiring civility in his dealings with stamp-purchasers as an unconscionable in-
terference with his professional autonomy .... ")
255. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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position to the use of the word "fuck" which feels like a content-based
sanction on speech.
But does the distinction hold up? If the sole concern is notice, there
is no distinction. In each case, the teacher is entirely without notice
that the incident would cause her not to be rehired. If the object to be
protected is speech, in each case, the board reached a judgment based
entirely on what the teacher said. In the hypothetical case, the board
decided not to rehire the teacher because it felt that the teacher's con-
duct was not up to the district's standards of performance. In Hos-
ford, the board decided not to rehire the teacher because it felt that
the teacher's conduct was substandard because of what she said, i.e.,
the use of profanity. To argue that the situation in Hosford was based
on an impermissible consideration assumes that regulating the use of
profanity in the classroom is, to borrow Hazelwood's terminology, not
a legitimate pedagogical concern, and it would be a rare court that
would reach such a conclusion directly.
In the end, the notice requirement is an anomaly invoked by courts
where they sense that an employment injustice has been done; an os-
tensibly speech-based right that protects employment, not speech, in
situations where the Constitution does not protect employment. As an
anomaly, of course, its application is less than uniform. Almost cer-
tainly, government employees whose work is not effected through
speech are dismissed for reasons they did not anticipate. "Academic-
freedom claims become too easily just ways of defending job secur-
ity."2 5 6 Providing an adequate measure of job security ought to be a
concern of any rational society, but it does not necessarily follow that
job security is a concern of the First Amendment.
XI. CONCLUSION
Academic freedom is of unquestioned importance and it comes in
many forms. The Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union2 57 was an important victory for the freedom of citizens
to exchange information on topics of their choosing. While some
would still like to exercise a religious veto over scientific inquiry, the
Constitution prevents the government from protecting religious be-
liefs from the results of scientific inquiry.2 58 Similarly, the freedom of
public employees to speak out on matters of public concern, while no
longer limited to the academy, unquestionably exists. 25 9 Academic
freedom ought to protect the work of publicly-employed scholars from
sanctions imposed for reasons unrelated to the scholarly merit of their
256. Edmund L. Pincoffs, Introduction in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, ix (Ed-
mund L. Pincoffs ed., 1972).
257. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
258. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
259. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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work, and public concern jurisprudence probably does so. In this
sense, academic freedom indeed is "a special concern of the First
Amendment. 2 60 Nonetheless while liberty is a special concern of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we do not assume that zoning regulations
are constitutionally suspect. Instead, we inquire further. When it
comes to academic freedom, however, we neither define our terms nor
inquire further. It is ironic that a value intended to strengthen our
basic premises by subjecting them to challenge, should go undefined
and unchallenged. Theories that are exempted from challenge tend to
be the weakest and the easiest to destroy once they are challenged. In
the spirit of inquiry then, courts and scholars alike should resolve that
when they speak of academic freedom they will define their terms, ask
the difficult questions and follow the argument where it leads.
260. Id. at 603.
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